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In this paper we explore the relationship between an equitable distribution of the cost shares 
in public-good provision on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. 
In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous distribution of cost shares that motivates 
some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal allocation 
which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand 
coalition. Distributional equity of the individual burdens of public-good contribution is 
assessed by a specific sacrifice measure (the “Moulin sacrifice”) which is derived from the 
egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core 
test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible 
outcome of a cooperative agreement in the public-good economy. 
JEL-Code: C71, D63, H41. 
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Pareto optimal allocations in public-good economies are hard to implement when there is no cen-
tral agency that has coercive power to enforce cooperation. Since no world government exists this 
is the typical situation in the international system such that, realistically, it cannot be expected that 
global public-goods like protection of the world climate will be provided at an efficient level. A 
major problem in this context is that collective action aiming at Pareto optimality in a public-good 
economy tends to be unstable which means that even if the partners have signed an agreement it is 
individually rational for them not to fulfil their obligations and to enjoy a free-ride instead. As in-
tuitive this widespread fear of instability of cooperative ventures in a public-good economy seems 
to be it is, however, not quite straightforward to pin it down to a distinct and unambiguous stability 
criterion.  
     The most common stability concept refers to the effects that are caused when a single agent 
unilaterally deviates from a cooperative arrangement and thus wants to stand aside as a free-rider. 
So, as known from the theory of cartel formation by oligopolistic firms (see d‟Aspremont et al., 
1983), an allocation is called internally stable if no participating agent would benefit from depart-
ing while all other agents still adhere to cooperation (see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993, Bar-
rett, 1994, or Finus, 2001, on this stability concept which is of particular importance in the context 
of international environmental agreements). It is, however, not certain that the agents left behind 
will always react in this way. When other agents, in the simple static version of the game at once 
or in the dynamic version in subsequent periods, instead completely abandon cooperation after one 
agent has pulled out this leads to the  -core concept as applied by Chander and Tulkens (1995). 
Such a strategy of punishment may effectively deter violation of the agents‟ duties and thus make 
cooperative arrangements self-enforcing and stable.  
     As an alternative to these of stability criteria that refer to individual deviations, collective devia-
tions of sub-groups of agents can be used as the starting point. This leads back to the traditional 
core concept (see Foley, 1970), which differs from Chander and Tulkens‟ (1995)  -core approach: 
An allocation is said to lie in the core of an economy if no coalition of agents is able to improve 
the welfare of all of its members by leaving (“blocking”) the original allocation and bringing about 
a new allocation in which only the endowments being available in the separating coalition are 
used. Focusing on standalone allocations of sub-groups the core criterion is, by definition, inde-
pendent of specific assumptions on the behaviour of the remaining agents since their contributions 3 
 
to the public good after separation are assumed to be zero.
1 If, however, these agents are not com-
plete free-riders but still make a positive contribution to the public good the incentive for some 
coalition to deviate is further increased (see e.g. Kolm, 2006, for a further discussion). So the core 
property indeed gives a “minimal rationale” for the stability of a cooperative arrangement, which 
also motivates “the relevance of the core to political reality” (Foley, 1970). For a further discus-
sion of the relationship between the core and the formation of specific coalition structure see Finus 
(2001) and Ray (2007). 
      Beyond  those  stability  issues  another  main  question  concerning  the  core  of  a  public-good 
economy is what specific properties make core allocations distinct from those outside the core. In 
this context, it has been suggested that there is some relationship between the core on the one hand 
and some notion of equity on the other. So Moulin (1987, p. 964) maintains that the core may 
serve as “a meaningful guideline in the search for equitable cost sharing” since it “means that no 
coalition should be charged more than its „stand alone‟ cost”.  But the remarks on this remain 
rather cursory and non-conclusive, and no explicit reference to distributional norms and equity 
criteria is made. The main objective of this paper, therefore, is to examine more closely what the 
core property of a Pareto optimal public-good allocation (and thus stability of cooperation in a 
specific sense) has to do with distributional equity. In particular we will show that any core alloca-
tion in a public-good economy must offer something like a fair burden-sharing in financing the 
public good where the equity standard is provided by the agents‟ levels of „Moulin sacrifices‟ be-
ing based on Moulin‟s (1987) famous egalitarian-equivalence concept. Otherwise, if there is an 
unequal distribution of the Moulin sacrifices, it becomes more likely that a sub-coalition of agents 
has an incentive to withdraw and to block the initially given allocation. From another perspective 
quite apart from Moulin‟s approach, a similar insight has also been put forward by Mas-Colell and 
Silvestre (1989) and Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) who have shown that the core of a public-good 
economy is equivalent to the set of ‟cost-share equilibria‟ which are characterized by a specific 
kind of incentive compatibility. As a by-product of our analysis we also develop a core test by 
which it can be examined in a simple way whether some given Pareto optimal allocation lies in the 
core or not.  
    
2. The Framework 
We consider a public-good economy consisting of   2 n  agents (see Bergstrom, Blume and Var-
ian, 1986, and Cornes and Sandler, 1996, as classical references). Each agent i  is endowed with 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of different core concepts see Chander and Tulkens (1997). 4 
 
i y  units of a private good that can either be used for private consumption  i x  or as an input 








  is the aggregate input to public-good production being the sum of all individual contri-
butions. The production function  () gZ is assumed to be differentiable, strictly monotone increas-
ing and to have (0) 0 g  . Thus, the case is included in which there are non-constant returns to scale 
in providing the public good. As the function  () gZ is invertible, we denote its inverse by  () cG 
which gives, in units of the private good, the costs of providing the public goodG .   
        Preferences of agent i are defined for all non-negative consumption bundles, consisting of 
private consumption i x  and public-good supplyG . They can be represented by a utility function 
( , ) ii u x G  which is assumed to have the standard properties, i.e. it is twice partial differentiable, 
strictly monotone increasing in both arguments and strictly quasi-concave. In addition we suppose 
that all indifference curves do not intersect the  i x -axis. This assumption facilitates the exposition 
in the general case and it is also fulfilled by the two types of utility functions which we will use in 
our illustrative examples, i.e. Cobb-Douglas utility functions on the one hand and quasi-linear util-
ity functions (that are linear in private consumption) on the other. 
      Let some Pareto optimal allocation  1 ( ,..., , )
A A A
n A x x G  be given. The utility level of agent  i in 
allocation  A is denoted by  ( , )
A A A
i i i u u x G  , and  ( ) ( , )
AA
i i i h G h G u   is the indifference curve corre-
sponding to 
A
i u  as a function of public-good supply G . Agent i’s contribution to the public good 
then is 
AA
i i i z y x , which, in principle, may be positive or negative. First of all, we define what is 
meant by blocking a given allocation and by the core property. 
 
    Definition 1: The given allocation  A can be blocked by a subgroup of agents, i.e. a coalition 
  1,..., K N n   of  kn   agents if there is an allocation 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ,..., , )
B K B K B K
k B K x x G   for coali-
tion K  such that 
 
(1)                                        
( ) ( ) ()
B K B K
iK
iK
c G x Y

      and 
(2)                                        
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
B K B K B K A
i i i i u u x G u   
 5 
 
holds for all agents  iK  . A Pareto optimal allocation   1 ( ,..., , )
A A A
n A x x G   lies in the core if no 
coalition exists that is able to block  A.  
 
This definition says that a blocking coalition  K  must be able to obtain a Pareto improvement for 





  that is available in subgroup K. The allocation  () BK  will be called a blocking 
standalone allocation of the deviating coalitionK .  If an allocation were not Pareto optimal it 
would, according to the criterion provided by Definition 1, trivially be possible to block it even by 
the whole group of all agents. To exclude this uninteresting possibility the definition is restricted 
to Pareto optimal allocations.  
      In order to characterize the core and to infer equity criteria for the core property we will make 
use of the egalitarian-equivalent public-good levels as devised by Moulin (1987). These are de-
fined as follows.  
 
Definition 2: Given some allocation  1 ( ,..., , )
A A A
n A x x G   agent  i´s egalitarian-equivalent level of 
public-good supply 
A
i G is given by 
 
(3)                                                     ( , ) ( , )
A A A A
i i i i i i u y G u x G u  . 
 
The Moulin sacrifice of agent i then is  
 
(4)                                                               :
A A A
ii s G G . 
 
The definition of egalitarian-equivalent public-good level means that agent  i has the same utility 
as in the original allocation  A when she consumes 
A
i G  of the public good and makes no contribu-
tion to the public good such that her private consumption is equal to her income  i y  (see Figure 1). 
Given the properties of utility functions assumed above, egalitarian-equivalent public-good levels 
exist and are uniquely determined for all agents  i if public-good supply 
A G  and all private con-
sumption levels 
A

















Agent i´s Moulin sacrifice then can be interpreted as an equivalent by which her public-good con-
tribution 
AA
i i i z y x  is transformed into units of the public good. It is a willingness-to-pay meas-
ure and indicates which amount of the public good agent i, starting from initial public-good supply 
A G ,  is ready to give up if she could in return increase her private consumption from 
A
i x  to  i y . 
Therefore, the Moulin sacrifice of an agent is a subjective burden for the contribution she makes to 
produce the public good, given allocation A. For the same agent the Moulin sacrifice is the higher 
the higher her individual public contribution is. For different agents that make a public-good con-
tribution of the same size the Moulin sacrifice is lower for the agent with the stronger preference 
for the public good and/or, given normality of the public good, with the higher income.
2 In the 
following section the Moulin sacrifice will be used as an equity standard by which the core prop-
erty can be characterized. 
 
3.  Blocking Coalitions of Overburdened Agents 
We first of all provide a basic condition which is necessary as well as sufficient for the ability of 
some coalition  K  to block a given allocation A. This simple requirement is in the spirit of duality 
theory (see Cornes, 1992), and it will serve as an instrument in our further considerations. 
 
                                                 














Figure 1: Egalitarian-equivalent public-good 





Proposition 1: A coalition K  can block the allocation  A if and only if there is some level of pub-
lic-good supply G  such that 
(5)                            
                     










Proof: (i) Only if: If  K  can block allocation  A by choosing the allocation  () BK , condition (2) 
directly gives that 
( ) ( ) ()
A B K B K
ii h G x   must hold for all  iK  . Then condition (5) is obvious ful-
filled by letting 
() BK GG  . 




d y h G c G

      The allocation  () BK  
defined by 
() BK GG    and 
( ) ( )()





  for all iK   then is feasible, given the total in-
come  K Y  of subgroup  K . Clearly,  () BK  blocks the initial allocation  A since all agents in sub-
groupK are strictly better off in  () BK  than in  A.                                                       QED. 
                                                                                  
Proposition 1 can now be used to explore the composition of potential blocking coalitions more 
closely. In this context we first show that, if blocking is possible at all, always a specific type of a 
blocking coalition exists. The idea is to leave out all agents that would need an income transfer in 
the blocking coalition and, at the same time, to add those agents that would be willing to make a 
positive contribution to the public good.    
 
Proposition 2: If an allocation  1 ( ,..., , )
A A A
n A x x G   can be blocked and thus is not in the core, there 
must be some threshold level s  for the Moulin sacrifices such that the agents with the highest sac-
rifice form the blocking coalition    :
A
i K i N s s    . 
 
Proof: Assume that some coalition  K  can block the given allocation A by choosing public-good 
supply 
() BK G . Then we first show that the coalition defined by   
() ::
B K A
i K i N G G       is also 
able  to  block  the  allocation A. As  indifference  curves  are downward sloping  we  clearly have
  
 
() : : ( )
A B K
ii K i N h G y      which implies the following inequalities: 
 
(6)                    







( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
A B K A B K B K
i i i i
i K K i K
y h G y h G c G
   
      . 8 
 
 
The first inequality in (6) holds since  
() ( ) 0
A B K
ii y h G   for all iK    from the definition of  K 
and, clearly,  K K K   .  The second inequality is obtained since for all agents  i that are in  K  
but not in  K we have 
() ( ) 0
A B K
ii y h G  , and the third inequality is implied by the only-if-part of 
Proposition 1. The if-part of Proposition 1 then directly gives that coalition  K is also able to 
block the allocation  A. If we now define 
() :
A B K s G G   as the threshold levels for the Moulin 
sacrifices the assertion of Proposition 2 follows since obviously   :
A
i K i N s s K     .      QED.         
                                                                                                                  
The construction made in the proof of Proposition 2 can verbally be explained as follows: We start 
from some coalition that blocks allocation  A  and has public-good supply 
() BK G .  Another block-
ing coalition K then is obtained 
  
  by having the same level 
() BK G  of public-good supply also in the blocking allocation that is 
chosen by coalition  K. 
  by eliminating all agents  iK   that only can attain utility 
A
i u  given public-good supply 
() BK G  when they receive a positive income transfer (and thus make a negative contribution 
to the public good in the original blocking allocation), 
  by adding all individuals iN   that could get utility 
A
i u  by making a non-negative contri-
bution to the public good if public-good supply were 
() BK G , 
 
The result in Proposition 2 basically says that, if an allocation can be blocked at all, there is always 
a blocking coalition consisting of those agents whose Moulin sacrifice is higher than that of the 
other agents outside the blocking coalition. If an allocation is not in the core there must be a group 
of “overburdened” agents that has an incentive to withdraw leaving behind the agents with low 
Moulin sacrifices. Those who are excluded from cooperation enjoyed some free-ride at the ex-
pense of the „overburdened‟ agents who then do better by leaving the original allocation.  
      It is a further straightforward implication of Proposition 2 that the existence of a blocking coa-
lition requires at least some heterogeneity of the levels of Moulin sacrifices. In this way a basic 9 
 
result obtained by Moulin (1987), which says that egalitarian-equivalent cost sharing and thus 
equality of the Moulin sacrifices leads into the core, is confirmed in an alternative way. 
3 
 
Proposition 3: The egalitarian-equivalent allocation  1 ( ,..., , )
E E E
n x x G  in which the Moulin sacrifice 
is identical for all agents lies in the core. 
 
By  a  standard  continuity  argument Proposition  3 entails  that any  Pareto  optimal  allocation  in 
which the individual Moulin sacrifices do not diverge too much will also be in the core. That the 
core property crucially depends on the degree of homogeneity of the Moulin sacrifices is rein-
forced by the following result which shows that a more balanced distribution of Moulin sacrifices 
makes it more likely that an allocation belongs to the core and in this sense is stable.   
 
Proposition 4: Assume that in an economy with n agents aggregate income and individual prefer-
ences are fixed and let some Pareto optimal allocation A be in the core for some initial income 
distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n yy . Then A remains in the core when a shift of income from one agent to an-
other is made that equalizes the distribution of the Moulin sacrifices but leaves their ranking un-
changed. 
 
Proof:  Assume that agents are ranked according to their Moulin sacrifices, i.e.  1 ...
AA
n ss . Then 
only by shifting income from an agent j to an agent lj  , which decreases the Moulin sacrifice of 
the donor and increases that of the recipient, leads to a more equal distribution of the Moulin sacri-
fices  if,  as  assumed,  the  ranking  of  the  sacrifice  levels is to  be kept  unchanged.  Let  for  any 
1,..., kn   aggregate income of the subgroup    ( ) 1,..., K k k   be denoted by  k Y  before the income 
transfer is  made  and  k Y  be  aggregate  income  of  this  subgroup  after  the  transfer.    Obviously, 
kk YY   for  kj   or  kj   and  kk YY   for  j k l  . It then follows from Proposition 1 that even 
after the transfer no subgroup  () Kk can block the given allocation  A. According to Proposition 3, 
however, some of these subgroups has to have the ability to block if  A can be blocked at all. This 
shows  that  the  allocation  A  remains  in  the  core  after  the  transfer  has  been  made.                                           
QED. 
     
                                                 
3 Note, however, that in other types of economies with a public good an egalitarian-equivalent allocation need not be 
in the core (see Hahn and Gilles, 1998).  10 
 
4. An Example 
The results of Propositions 3 and 4 can be illustrated by a simple example in which there are two 
agents  1,2 i   with identical Cobb-Douglas preferences, i.e.  ( , ) ii u x G xG  . The production tech-
nology for the public good now has constant returns to scale and aggregate income is  1 Y  .  Let  
12 ( , ) yy denote any income distribution and  12 ( , , )
A A A A x x G   some Pareto optimal allocation. It 
directly  follows  from  the  Samuelson  rule  that  Pareto  optimality  requires 
1
2













 which she has in  A.  We now depict the set of core allo-
cations in a diagram (see Figure 2) with 1 y at the horizontal and  1
A x  at the vertical axis. The lower 





A xy  , where agent 1 is indifferent between staying in the 
coalition and choosing her standalone allocation. The upper contour is analogously obtained from 
the  non-blocking  condition  for  agent  2,  which  gives   
22













M   such 
that the set of core allocation is represented by the lens OM.                                                                        
                                                                                                      













Figure 2: The core in the case of iden-
tical Cobb-Douglas preferences 












Egalitarian-equivalent public-good supply 
A
i G  of agent  1,2 i   then is obtained from the condition 
1
2
A A A A





















 as Moulin sacrifice of agent  i .  
Equality of both agents‟ Moulin sacrifices, i.e.  12
AA ss  , is attained if  11
1
2
A xy   which yields the 
straight line that connects the points O and M.  This equal Moulin sacrifice line clearly lies within 
the core lens OM which confirms Proposition 3 for the special case. Below (above) the equal sacri-
fice line agent 1‟s Moulin sacrifice is larger (smaller) than that of agent 2.  
      Now let us start from some point  K  in the lens that lies below the equal sacrifice line and fix  
the level of agent 1‟s private consumption  1
A x .  An income transfer from agent 1 to agent 2, lead-
ing to point L,  reduces agent 1‟s Moulin sacrifice and increases that of agent 2 thus equalizing the 
distribution of Moulin sacrifices. As long as the original ranking of the Moulin sacrifices is not 
changed by the transfer, i.e.  L still lies to the right of the equal Moulin sacrifice line,  L is con-
tained in the core lens. This confirms Proposition 4 for the specific example. Note that, under the 
otherwise same assumptions, this includes the case where the transfer from agent 1 to agent 2 
gives a more equal income distribution. In general, however, equalization of income may lead out 
of the core. In Figure 2 this would happen if the original point K’ were close to the origin O and 
income is shifted from agent 2 to agent 1, which is depicted by the move from    K  to   L .  
   
5. Determinants of Moulin Sacrifice and the Special Case of Quasi-Linear Preferences 
When preferences and income levels are the same for all agents there is clearly a perfect correla-
tion between an agent‟s Moulin sacrifice and her contribution to the public good. But in the gen-
eral case the size of the individual Moulin sacrifice is also determined by the level of personal in-
come and individual preferences. So an agent i‟s Moulin sacrifice not only becomes high (low) for 
a large (small) contribution to the public good 
A
i z  but also for a low (high) income level  i y  when 
the public good is non-inferior and a weak (strong) individual preference for the public good (see 
Buchholz and Peters, 2008). In the special situation when all agent make a public-good contribu-
tion of equal size Proposition 2 thus implies that a coalition of agents with low income or weak 
preferences for the public good will have a rather high incentive to break off.
4 
    In order to explain, in the case of homogenous preference s, how different income levels affect 
the Moulin sacrifice we look again at the example of the previous section where two agents have 
                                                 
4 For the case of an economy with multilateral externalities a related result concerning different preferences has been 
suggested by Helm (2001). 12 
 
the same utility function  ( , ) i i i u x G xG  , aggregate endowment is  1 Y   and the Pareto optimal 
allocation  12
1 7 1
( , , ) ( , , )
16 16 2
A A A A x x G    is  given.  The  income  distribution  now  is  taken  to  be 
12
16
( , ) ( , ).
77









A s   while the contributions to the public good are  1
9
112
A z   and  2
47
112
A z  . So 
even though agent 1 makes a much smaller public-good contribution in allocation A than agent 2 
she has nevertheless the higher Moulin sacrifice. The explanation is that the willingness to pay for 
the public good is higher for the rich agent 2 than for the poor agent 1 such that, as measured in 
public-good equivalents, the higher public-good contribution means a lower subjective burden for 
agent 2. Examples that highlight the effect of a diversity of preferences can also easily be con-
structed, e.g. by applying different asymmetric Cobb-Douglas utility functions for both agents. 
     The income effect, i.e. the increase of marginal willingness to pay for the public good when 
income increases, is excluded when agents have quasi-linear utility preferences given by 
 
(7)                                                       ( , ) ( ) i i i u x G x G   . 
 
where  ( ) 0 G    and  ( ) 0 G   . 
5 Such preferences are of special importance in environmental  
economics where the private good  i x  serves as the numéraire and the benefit of environmental  
quality G is measured in monetary terms, i.e. in units of the numéraire good. For preferences as  
described in (7) all indifference curve are parallel along the  i x -axis such that equal Moulin  
sacrifice with equal public-good contributions (see Figure 3 for two agents j and k) and a higher  









                                                 
5 This case is also considered by Chander and Tulkens (1997) in their analysis of coalition stability. 13 
 
                            












With quasi-linear preferences it is then possible to take the levels of public-good contributions 
A
i z
instead of the Moulin sacrifices 
A
i s  as indicators for the individual burden that result for different 
agents in allocation A. In this case Proposition 3 reads as follows: 
    
 Proposition 5: Assume that all agents have the same quasi-linear utility function. If an allocation 
1 ( ,..., , )
A A A
n x x G  is not in the core of the economy then there is some  z  such that the coalition 
  :
A
i K i N z z     can block the allocation. 
 
So if in the case of identical quasi-linear preferences an allocation can be blocked at all there must 
be a group with relatively high public-good contributions that has an incentive to separate.  
 
6. A Simple Core Test  
To know whether a certain Pareto optimal allocation  A lies in the core or not is important since, 
according to our previous analysis, all core allocations are both equitable and stable and thus are 
obvious candidates for cooperative solutions in a public-good economy. The core of a public-good 
economy normally is rather large, even if the number of agents in the public-good economy is high 
which makes a sharp contrast to economies with public goods. (Example for this major result on 
the core in a public-good economy are provided, e.g., by Milleron, 1972, Muench, 1972, and more 
recently by Buchholz and Peters, 2007. Conley, 1994, Wooders, 1997, Vasil‟ev, Weber and Wi-
Figure 3: Public-good contributions and 






j x j y A










esmeth, 1995, and Allouch, 2010, however, describe specific situations in which the “Edgeworth 
conjecture” also holds in the presence of public goods.) Moreover, if one wants to make a specific 
selection among the core allocations no “natural” solution exists which would make all other core 
allocations uninteresting and thus render a core test redundant. So it is a well-known fact that not 
only Moulin‟s egalitarian-equivalent solution but in the case of a constant returns technology also 
the Lindahl equilibrium belongs to the core (see Foley, 1970). In most cases, however, both solu-
tions will not coincide. This ambiguity supports the view that all core allocations should “have a 
claim on our attention as outcomes of plausible political processes” (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, 
p.303). We therefore now want to develop a procedure by which it can be easily checked which 
allocations lie in the core. 
     The proposed core test works as follows: Again we rank the agents according to their Moulin 
sacrifice levels in a given allocation  A, i.e. as in the proof of Proposition 4, we assume  
 
(8)                                                     1 ...
AA
n ss  
 
and  consider  the  subgroups  () Kk.  For  any  1,..., 1 kn    we  then  consider  the  function                             
1





Y G h G c G

    which, in the spirit of duality theory (see Cornes, 1992, for a general 
presentation), gives the minimum aggregate income that is needed to have public-good supply G  
when each agent in coalition  () Kk to attain the utility level 
A
i u   and public-good supply is G . By 
ˆ A
k G  we then denote the public-good level that minimizes  ()
A
k YG   (and which is characterized by 
the Samuelson rule 
1









  ). Thus, we obtain the minimum amount of aggregate 
income which is needed to provide utility 
A
i u  for each agent  () i K k        
                                 
(9)                                                          
1
ˆˆ ˆ : ( ) ( )
k
A A A A
k i k k
i
Y h G c G

  . 
 
It is now easily possible to infer whether a given allocation  A is a core allocation or not.       
 
Proposition 6: Given the ranking (8) an allocation is in the core of the public-good economy if 
and only if 15 
 
  









       
 
for all  1,..., 1 kn  . 
 
Proof: The result directly follows from combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 3.               QED. 
 
The criterion for the core property that is provided by Proposition 6 is simple insofar as at most 
1 n  coalitions have to be inspected in order to confirm the core property of the given allocation 
A. The number of required tests therefore is much lower than the total number of all possible coa-








  .  
 
7.  Conclusion 
The core property which means the impossibility to improve by separation for any subgroup is a 
general condition for the stability of cooperative solutions. In a public-good economy as consid-
ered in this paper a Pareto optimal allocation lies in the core if no sub-coalition is able to provide 
the same utility levels to its members as in the original allocation by only using a smaller amount 
of resources as being available in this sub-coalition. Using this basic core criterion, it was possible 
to give an intuitive interpretation of the core property that refers to an equity norm. So it could be 
shown that just those coalitions whose members bear a high Moulin sacrifice and so are disadvan-
taged relative to other agents can be expected to have the ability to block. Therefore, equity w.r.t. 
to the levels of Moulin sacrifices is necessary and sufficient for the core property of an allocation 
and thus for its stability. In this way we extend the result by Moulin (1987) who has, under addi-
tional  assumptions,  given  a  core-based  characterization  of  the  egalitarian-equivalent  solution 
where Moulin sacrifices are equal.   
     The Moulin sacrifice concept moreover incorporates both the ability-to-pay and the benefit 
principle as additional equity norms, whose application requires consideration of the individual 
characteristics of the participating agents, i.e. their income and their preferences. Thus, in total, a 
relationship between stability of cooperation according to the core concept and the three classical 
basic  principles  for  fair  burden-sharing  (equality  of  sacrifice,  ability-to-pay,  benefit  principle) 
could be established. This not only resuscitates a very long and venerable tradition in the public 16 
 
finance literature but also gives an additional and normatively sound motivation for the core con-
cept.  
     In reality blocking coalitions of overburdened agents often will have the difficulty to identify 
and organize themselves, and it is not a priori clear which coalition in fact will withdraw (see Ray, 
2007, for a general discussion). If such transaction costs are high, splitting-off by a subgroup be-
comes more difficult and an unfair burden-sharing in a cooperative venture is more likely to per-
sist. Formation of a blocking coalition is impeded less when the distribution of burdens follows an 
easily discernible geographic pattern such that some regions feel exploited by the others. Then 
stability of a federation is endangered because the disadvantaged regions may gain from becoming 
politically independent thus “blocking” the common state. Even though the relationship between 
interregional distribution and stability is, at a general level, a major topic in the theory of federal-
ism, specific application to public-good provision and reference to the core concept is rare. In this 
sense, this paper also tries to bring the theory of federalism and standard public-good theory closer 
together. 
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